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RECENT DECISIONS
The problem herein involved was dearly one of extreme national
importance, and a statute whereby a state seeks to "isolate itself from
difficulties common to all of them" is definitely diametrically opposed
to national unity. To employ the phraseology of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
"It (the Federal Constitution) was framed upon the theory that the
peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in
the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." 13
E. D. R.
CRIMINAL LAw-EvIDENCE-CORROBORATION OF ACCOMPLICE
AS TO MATTERS CONNECTING DEFENDANT WITH THE CRimE.-The
defendant is charged with the murder of one Shuman, whose body was
found in a stolen automobile in the Borough of Brooklyn. The de-
fendant and the deceased were members of that borough's group of
criminals known as "Murder, Inc.". The deceased was believed to
have been conveying certain secret information to a member of the
Detective Bureau and for that reason the members of the "corpora-
tion" desired to have him killed. The accused was chosen as the
person to do the killing, and by a ruse the decedent was enticed into
the automobile and was shot. Among three accomplices there was
one by the name of Reles who testified on behalf of the State that
the defendant was the murderer. To corroborate the accomplice,
non-accomplice witnesses testified that the decedent did have certain
conversations with a member of the police force; that the automobile
in which the decedent was found was stolen from the non-accomplice
witness; that a policeman was on duty at all times at the place of
killing first planned; that the accomplice, Reles, was present at the
apartment of one, Lepke, about whom the decedent was telling the
police. At the trial, the court was requested to charge that the evi-
dence by the non-accomplice witnesses was insufficient to corroborate
the accomplice. The court so charged and added that the evidence
did not tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime but was intended to corroborate the witness as to whether or
not he was "telling the truth as to credibility." To this, counsel took
objection and the court again charged that the evidence did not tend
to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime but it
did "tend to show, or prove or disprove, the credibility of a witness."
Held, judgment of conviction reversed and a new trial ordered. The
People of the State of New York v. Irving Nitzberg, 287 N. Y. 183,
38 N. E. (2d) 490 (1941).
There has always been a natural distrust of the testimony of an
accomplice to a crime. Prior to the enactment of Section 399 of the
13 Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523, 55 Sup. Ct. 497 (1935).
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Code of Criminal Procedure,' a conviction could be had upon the
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice alone. But the courts
would instruct the jury to weigh strictly the uncorroborated testimony
of the accomplice. 2  The subsequent enactment of the Statutes did
not establish any exclusive test for the admissibility of evidence which
tends to corroborate the evidence of the accomplice. Therefore, there
may be no conviction unless the accomplice's testimony is corroborated
by independent evidence which connects the defendant with the crime
charged.4 The court in a four-to-three decision held that the evidence
in this case was insufficient to convict the defendant. There was
nothing, said the majority, that identified the defendant as a partici-
pant in the crime. The evidence of the non-accomplice witnesses was
also inadmissible to support the credibility of Reles since "it was
on merely slight, remote or conjectural significance" and tended to
surprise and prejudice the defendant. 5 The dissent by Judge Lewis
contended that the non-accomplice testimony did not prejudice the
rights of the defendant since it served to "confirm and give credence
to the narrative."
J. A. S.
CRIMINAL LAW - PARDON - SECOND OFFENDER - EFFECT OF
PARDON BY ExEcUTIvE.-Relator was convicted of attempted robbery
in the third degree upon his plea of guilty. The District Attorney
of the county filed an information:' accusing relator of having been
convicted previously in a federal court of robbing a member bank of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Relator acknowledges
his former conviction and was sentenced as a second offender.2 Al-
though the records establish his conviction in the federal court, it
also appears from official records that two years after his conviction
3CoD Calm. PRoc. § 399 L. 1881, c. 442, as amd. L. 1882, c. 3.
"A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless
he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the crime."
2 People v. Dixon, 231 N. Y. 111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921); Lindsay v.
People, 63 N. Y. 143 (1875).
3 See note 1, supra.
'People v. Kress, 284 N. Y. 452, 31 N. E. (2d) 898 (1940); People v.
Maione, 284 N. Y. 423, 31 N. E. (2d) 759 (1940) ; People v. Feolo, 284 N. Y.
381, 31 N. E. (2d) 496 (1940).
A charge to the jury that if they believe "the testimony of the witness
Reles [accomplice] they cannot convict on his testimony unless it is corroborated
by other independent, believable evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the crime," was held to be a proper charge. People v. Gold-
stein, 285 N. Y. 376, 34 N. E. (2d) 362 (1941).
5 People v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 70, 102 N. E. 546 (1913).
IN. Y. PENAL LAW § 1943.
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1941.
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